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ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE, NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS AND MORAL TEACHING OF ILLOCUTIONARY ACT OF ASSERTIVES: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF SASAK COMMUNITY

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates and explores the illocutionary force, normative dimensions and moral teaching of speech acts, namely assertives. For having empirical data, there were 8 participants as the sources for data collection: 1 tuan guru who giving speech in formal context and 7 people were participated for casual conversations in informal context. Results prove that assertives are categorized based on its illocutionary force having seven core components, advocated the normative and moral dimensions of assertives generated from agent change normative standing in terms of right, obligation and responsibility; argued moral value embedded in speech act performance could be taught on bases of its normative and moral features. As a result, moral values teaching on the bases of moral values of assertive like honesty, truth, credibility could be taught in order to foster children good character development in comprehensive ways including moral reasoning, affection and behaviors. For that reason, moral values teaching grounded on speech act normativity and morality might be done in the procees of acquiring of the first language or learning the second/foreign language emphasizing the importance of moral competence as the foundation for children moral action in establishing good interpersonal relationships.

Keywords: Illocutionary force, normative and moral dimension, moral teaching

FORCE ILOKUSIONER, DIMENSI NORMATIF DAN PEMBELAJARAN MORAL TINDAKAN ILOKUSIONER ASERTIF: KAJIAN EKSPLORASI KOMUNITAS SASAK

ABSTRAK

Kajian ini mengkaji dan mengeksplorasi *force* ilokusioner, dimensi normatif dan pembelajaran moral tindakan berbahasa, yakni asertif. Untuk mendapatkan data empiris, ada 8 partisipan sebagai sumber pengumpulan data: 1 tuan guru yang berpidato dalam konteks formal dan 7 orang terlibat percakapan kasual dalam konteks informal. Hasil kajian ini membuktikan bahwa tindakan asertif dikategorikan berdasarkan *force* ilokusionernya yang memiliki 7 komponen inti; menemukan dimensi normatif dan moral yang diturunkan dari alterasi kedudukan narmatif agen terhadap pendengar dalam hal hak, kewajiban dan pertanggung jawaban; dan membuktikan bahwa nila-nilai moral yang melekat dalam performan tindakan berbahasa memungkinkan untuk diajarkan yang didasarkan pada fitur normatif dan moral yang dimiliki. Sehingga pembelajaran nilai-nilai moral yang ada dalam tindakan berbahasa asertif seperti, nilai kejujuran, kebenaran, kredibilitas bisa ajarkan kepada anak untuk membantu meningkatkan perkembangan karakter anak yang baik dengan cara yang komprehensif yang mencakup nalar moral, afeksi dan tindakan. Oleh karena itu, pembeljaran nilai moral didasarkan pada normativitas dan moralitas tindakan berbahasa bisa dilakukan dalam proses pemerolehan bahasa pertama dan pengajaran bahasa kedua atau ketiga yang menekankan pentingnya kompetensi moral sebagai dasar tindakan moral anak dalam membangun hubungan interpersonal yang baik.

Katakunci: *Force* ilokusioner, dimensi normatif dan moral, pembelajaran moral

INTRODUCTION

Sasak language is primarily spoken in Lombok Island, West Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia, near to the East region of Bali. There is a great deal of linguistic features within Sasak language. Traditionally, Sasak language has five dialects: a) *Ngeno-ngene*, in the Central West coast and the Central East to the North East coast; b) *Meno-mene*, around Puyung and Praya, and in the East Lombok; c) *Ngeto-ngete*, around Suralaga, and Sembalun in the North East: d) Kuto-kute, around Bayan region and in the North; and e) *Meriaq-meriku*, in the South central area around Bonjeruk, and Sengkol.

In accordance to these varieties, the occurrence of language use in Sasak community may be not only influenced by linguistic factors, but also affected by its culture, norms and values. The South Sikur villagers are bilingual community. Sasak language, *Meno-mene* dialect—is used in daily communication with one another at home, in and around the Mosque, and other domains. These people speak Indonesian in formal setting and at school. Indonesian is also used when meeting with new comers.

Language is an utterance that has a communicative and performative function. This fact is Austin's underlying assumption in generating his speech act theory. A locutionary act is produced by saying something and an illocutionary act is by doing something. Austin's initiation led opponents and proponents to dispute on the nature and elements of speech acts.

One of the most argued unit is the nature of illocutionary acts. Some believe illocutionary act (IA) is the basis of rule or conventional act such as Austin, Sbisa, Searle, and Vanderveken. On the contrary, others hold, it is grounded on intention or inference-based act like Grice, Strawson, Schiffer, Bach and Harnish, and Kissine. Given these different views, both sides have developed speech act theory in different ways. For instance, the criteria for speech act typology are based on illocutionary force and propositional attitude. Regarding with such tensions, the identification of these types of speech acts in Sasak language is needed.

The dispute on the role of attitude as the ground for distinguishing the types of illocutionary acts breaks down, since not every act has attitude uttered. For this reason, efforts of developing and exploring the normativity of speech acts have attracted the intention of linguists and analytical philosophers. Searle's identification about the commitment that consists in illocutionary act is under desire-independent reason for action on the bases of conceptual apparatus like direction of fit, intention, condition of staisfaction and the rest.

Under other conditions, Alston extends Searle's necessary condition of making promise to form the normative stance of taking responsibility in a given act (2001). For Alston the noramtive stance of speech acts are rule-subjection and such normativities are illocutionary act potentials.

Normative dimension embedded to speech act is crucial element for claiming that to perform locutionary act is io ipso to perform illocutionary acts. According to Cuneo (2014), speech act normativity exist in the performance of speech acts by way of agents' having right, obligation and responsibility. This claim imply that having properties or set of necessary an sufficient condition like arguing by perlocutionary intention and conventional/rule based is not adequately explanatory for illocutionary act performed by way of locutionary acts.

Extending Searle and Alston view on normative stance highlighting to speaker, for Cuneo, either S or H is bind by that normativity of speech act. Furthermore, normative dimension encompasses the tree related concepts such as right, obligation and responsibility. The normative dimension of speech count actual or conditional right, actual and conditional generated obligation and responsibility (see Cuneo pp.29-43). By these principles, Cuneo propose comprehensive concept of normative dimension of speech acts, especially, assertives, commissive and imperative. His notions are more adequate than that of Searle (2001) and Alston (2000) arguing that normative features just refer to commitment and responsibility respectively.

In addition, Cuneo rejected perlocutionary intention view believing that some normative dimension is derived from speech acts. As his argument, if such normative dimensions are generated from speech act, it is not important to explain the normative theory of speech act. This position seems to be underpinned by his belief that the performance of speech acts is subject to agents' having right, obligation and responsibility. Such normative standing exist when S alter his normative standing to H or audiences.

Another crucial claim by Cuneo is those normative dimensions of speech acts are moral. In these respect, some of normative dimensions have moral aspects. Moral aspect of such normativity in the case of assertive, commisive and imperative is the count generated for moral right; obligation and responsibility (see Cuneo pp. 85-97). Based on his claim, it differs from Searle (2001) that the normative dimensions of speech acts have no relationship with moral dimension. His claim that only some of normative dimensions have moral aspect is not in line with Adam claim that all speech acts have moral dimension. It seems to such notions based on philosophical position taken. For Cuneo viewing that normative dimension from moral realist believing pluralism is based on assumption such normative and moral dimension might be

overlapping to their concepts such as prudential, legal, and practice base generating right, obligation and responsibility.

However, Cuneo claim that normative moral dimension of speech acts embedded to speech acts did not care about the other source of reason for action such as facts and intentional state. Such sources of reason need to be considering for providing explanatory adequacy of speech act argument. This imply to practical reason that become valid reason for action covering relationship of those source of reason in speech act performance. His notion is also need to be extended to empirical cases that cover all types and subtypes of speech acts which some might possibly have special way sfor performing speech act that are successful and non-defective grounded on normative and moral stance.

Dealing with Searle's on commitment, Alston's normative stance and Cuneo normative standing, it is important to identify and examine profoundly the types of normative and moral dimensions of speech acts in Sasak speech community. In addition, having moral dimension is representation of moral values of speech act that might be used for moral or character education.

Their notions have contributed into the normative state of speech act. However, for Searle, the commitment that is consisted in speech acts has nothing to do with moral domain, while in Austin's account the role of social pressures is the main source for the existence of normative stance of a given act. Searle's ignorance of moral issue, a person's point of view, interpersonal communication in the case of commitment like obligation, responsibility in performing speech act is inconsistent with the nature of interpersonal communication, the fundamental principles of morality. Meanwhile, Alston's claim is lacking internal factors in respect to normativity and has no speaker clear-cut point of view generated in speech act performance. Furthermore, while Cuneo analyzed normative and moral dimensions of three types of speech acts, assertive, commisive and imperatives, he has no accounts on the possibility of such normative and moral value of speech act performance as an arena for moral teaching or character education.

Even the sample provided are limited and based on intuition. For these reason, the types of any category have any subtypes having special normative standing could be extended by analyzing empirical data for proving more adequate description on the normative and moral dimension of speech acts, especially assertive.

In accordance with relationship between normative and moral features of speech acts and moral teaching, it seems that another problem arises from the cognitive-moral development approach as a fundamental principle for moral teaching. Children are different in making decisions about goodness and wrongness, according to their level and stages of moral judgment. The view on moral judgment that is developmental-cognitive in nature seems that teaching moral is static and gradual, involving step by step fashion like building a block. Such approach was identified by Rousseu, Dewey, Piaget, and Kohlberg, in education, has been already adopted. One of the most mainstream approaches in moral education is Kohlberg's cognitive moral development approach.

Given the assumption of a universal moral development with three levels and six stages (Kohlerg, 1984), Kohlberg's moral-cognitive development has been a crucial consideration in relation to moral teaching in education all over the world. Nonetheless, the ground of this approach has some degrees against the fundamental principles of morality, there is actual inconsistency between intellectual reasoning and moral behavior. Sometimes, people act like pre-moral though they are in post conventional situation or autonomy. Furthermore, it is suggested to teach moral values through civic education. On that account, there is no concern for the role of language in teaching moral values i.e. moral dimensions of speech acts might be an arena of moral teaching or education in different context, school, family and community.

In addition, relationship between second language acquisition and speech acts conducted by Blum-Kulka and Ohlstain (1986), Kasper and Blum-Kulka (1993), Ellis (1992) and others seem to be focused only on the acquisition of particular speech acts such as promise, compliment and so forth as well as its relationship to classroom interaction. The studies are motivated in addressing the importance of improving students' sociolinguistic and communicative competence. However, in reality the problem is not only about such competences, but also on student's moral awareness.

Another recent study was conducted by Rakoczy and Tomasello (2009), Lohse, Grafenhein, Behne, and Rakoczy (2014) which focused on children's understanding of speech act normativity. This study seems to be based on psychology and concerns with only the role of direction of fit as a benchmark in analyzing children's understanding of speech act normativity. Their findings indicate the significant relationship of students understanding such normative dimension with the direction of fit as the criterion for the condition of satisfaction in speech act performance. However, in this case, other crucial apparatus like the role of intentionality and normative standing, second person standpoint were ignored.

Based on the aforementioned gaps either in normative and moral dimension of speech acts and moral or character education, the aim of this paper is to identify the normative and moral dimensions in performing assertives in Sasak language by sampling a Tuan Guru speech and casual conversations. Moreover, it is essential to extend, explore, and study about the nature of normative dimension of speech acts regarding to types, features, and other concept pertaining to normativity and morality of speech acts such as intentionality, reason for action and second person standpoint. This might be an expected starting point in moral teaching or character education by the means of language institution, which speech morality having moral values is possibly plausible for building children or student's good character.

METHOD

One of the most fundamentals in analyzing the type of speech acts is through analysis of double structure, namely its illocutionary force and propositional content. The method used is qualitative-exploratory. It means the study is in the form of qualitative and exploratory combinations. The type of exploratory is investigative in the sense of examining and analyzing in order to extend previous theoretical concept on normative and moral dimensions of speech. On that procedure, the generalization that is inductive derivation is about the normative and moral state of act in terms of language institution, its process, and necessary condition.

To achieve the objective of the study, the approaches were approached thorugh pragmatic and analytical philosophy, and moral philosophy. In this proposed study, observation and recording method were applied to collect data. Thorough and meticulous procedures of collecting, analyzing and examining the data were conducted in order to achieve the purposes of the study. Spoken data from 8 participants: one participant is a Tuan Guru giving speech in formal setting; and 7 participants are people involving in casual conversations for informal setting. Those were taken through observing and recording in South Sikur village using *Meno-mene* dialect.

Observation by recording was done for about 3 months. Tuan guru speech was recorded on 5th August 2015 with duration 12 minutes 58 second.. The casual conversations were recorded in 12th October 2015 with duration 1 hour 23 minutes. Moreover, data recorded from Tuan Guru speeches and casual conversations in South Sikur village were conducted from August until October . The recorded data will be transcribed into English

The data collected were analyzed in terms of data reduction, data display, and classification. The process of selecting, focusing, abstracting, simplifying, and transforming was conducted for assertive illocutionary act of assertive. In this case, the category illocutionary act of assertive is based on Searle's and Vanderveken decomposition of illocutionary forces covering: illocutionary point, degree of strength and mode of achievement of illocutionary point, propositional content condition, preparatory condition, sincerity condition and its degree of strength of sincerity condition.

Primary data taken from Sasak spoken language was translated into English. Data transcription of utterances was based on pragmatic principle: illocutionary force and propositional content ot *f(p).* In this respect, the code label was in according to language; Sasak, and English. The code transcription of Sasak used italic and English used regular writing. The illocutionary act of assertive was classified based on Searle and Vanderveken's decomposition of illocutionary force having seven core components. In relation to identification on the natures of normative and moral dimension of illocutionary acts, it was based normative features, moral features, intentionality and reason for action.

FINDING AND DISCUSSION

Illocutionary act of assertive

Based on the data collected and analyzed, assertives identified consists of a number of subtypes: asserting, explaining, describing, telling, aggreeing, stating, concluding, and aswering. The illocutionary act of assertives was categorized on the basis of illocutionary force (IF). In this respect, the force included seven elements of IF: illocutionary points, the degree of strength of the illocutionary point, the mode of achievement, the propositional content condition, the preparatory condition, the sincerity condition and the degree of strength of sincerity condition. The followings are subtypes of the assertives found in tuan guru (TG) and casual conversation (CC) as in lines (1-14):

(1) TG: *Ndeq araq sarat dengan saq rujuq. (*asserting*)*

No-D there-adv requirement-n people-n who-pron reconciliation

There is no requirement for people to reconcile.

(2) TG: *Sekalipun pegawean halal, saq aren beseang nuq kurang bagus. (*describing)

Though-P action-n allowed-A, What-RP called-v divorce-n not- good-A.

Though it is an allowed action, what is called divorce is not good.

(3) TG:*Lamun wah rujuq nuq wajib beng hak untuk senine*. (explaining)

If-conj already-adv reconcile-v obligatory-A give-v right-n for-P wife-n

If a husband has been reconciled, it is obligatory to give the right for his wife.

(4) TG: *Napi haq semame leq senine?* (questioning)

What-adv right-n husband-n over-P wife-n

What is the husband's right over his wife?

*Hak seorang semame wajib tetaati, tehormati. (*responding/answering*)*

Right-n a-D husband-n obligatory-A obeyed-v, respected-v

It is a husband's right to be obeyed and respected.

Casual conversation (CC)

(5) C: //Kan mako gecok talet wayah nuq.(asserting)

Cut tobacco-NP plant-v parent-n

Cutting the tobacco planted by your parents.

(6) A: Mahen mako gecok. (stating)

Expensive-A cut tobacco-NP

Cutting tobacco is expensive.

(7) A: *=Timak mako gecok, mun selamet jaq, beleq mauk keping endah. (*stating*)*

Though-conj cut tobacco-NP, If-conj successful-A, much-D money-n

Though it is just cutting tobacco, if it is successful, we earn much money.

(8)A: *Ndeq iniq ngkah saqit semeniq (bungkak) onos anuq geres julun wiq nuq.(*telling*)*

Not-adv can-mod heal-v back-n beacause of-PP carrying-ger sand-n day before yesterday

My back cannot heal because I was carrying away the sand the day before yesterday.

(9)A: *Saq tokon-tokon meni ampoq berirap. (*telling/informing*)*

When-adv sitting-ger felt-v

When I am just sitting like this, it feels painful.

(10)E*: Nun, jaq mulen. (*agreeing*)*

Yes-adv it-pron does-mod

Yes, it does.

(11)A: *Dunie nik congok congo:::k lat to bih mate.(*asserting*)*

World-n this-D sit-v later-adv all-pron die-v

Just sit now, in this world later we all die.

(12)D: *Sugih jari belian nane. (*remark/concluding*)*

Rich-A be-aux dukun-n now

It is rich to be a dukun now.

(13)A: *Mun begadang jaq becat kurang daraq. (*concluding*)*

If-conj stay up-PV high-adv low-A blood-n

If you stay up, it makes low blood pressure.

The illocutionary force components of assertives includes as follows:

1. Illocutionary Points (henceforth IP)

The illocutionary point or the purpose of assertive is to tell other people about the state of things as they are. As indicated in lines 1-14, the illocutionary point of the subtypes is the same though they all have a different force. For instance as in line 1, the point of affirming is to tell the audiences or hearers that there is no requirement for reconciliation while in line (6) A affirms that D's parents are planting the tobacco.

2. Degree of strength and mode of achievement of illocutionary point

Achieving IP of assertive has a degree of strength and mode of achievement. In this respect, though all subtypes of assertive as in lines (1-14) are the same in the sense of telling people about the state of things, they differ in some degrees in terms of strength and mode of achievement. For instance, contrast an assertive performance by the tuan guru 1 (14) and a speaker in a casual conversation (15) (henceforth CC):

(14) TG: *Kanggo tulakang saq nine nuq tanpa kawin dulu kance dengan lain. (confirming)*

Allowed-A bring-v that=D woman-n without-P first-adv with-P another-pron

It is allowed to bring a woman back without being married first with another.

(15) D: *Becat dait mah lamun girang mangan isiq me panas. (asserting)*

Susceptible-A get-v if-conj frequnetly-adv eat-v with-P hot-A rice-n

It is susceptible to get peptic ulcer if you frequently eat hot rice.

In line (14), the assertion performed demands a special authority of the speaker in order to make the audience believe it. In this case, the tuan guru has the power that is collectively recognized and accepted by society, especially Muslims. Thus, in achieving the point of his assertion he must invoke his social status as a tuan guru in order to whatever he asserts and make it true. It differ from the feature of assertion in line (15) in which speaker do not invokes power at all. In this case, the S also asserts a given proposition grounded on what he believes in such reality. Though assertion in line (15) is probably true, its degree of achieving the point is lesser than that of the assertion in line (14). Furthermore, as in (14) the mode of achievement assertion does not require the S's power or to be an authority. Otherwise, it needs the S's power or authority in achieving the point of asserting.

3. Propositional content condition

The most common form of illocutionary acts are *F(P)*, force functions to the assignment of a particular condition of an associated propositional content. In line (15), the content of proposition is about the S telling the truth of reality (ontologically subjective or objective) on the basis of the S's belief. As identified in line (14), the truth of proposition asserted is based on the S's belief that isbased on Islamic principles. Otherwise, as in line (15), the truth of proposition asserted and grounded on the S's belief without any reference to Islamic rules.

4. Preparatory condition

Performing IA can be successful, but defective or successful and non-defective. Ideally, in order to be successful and non defective, the preparatory conditions of the assertion is the H or the Addressee needs the foundation for supposing the truth of of what the S asserted. In this case, as in line (1) and (4), the TG asserted based on the reconciliation rules and husband obligation in Islam Moreover, in case of casual conversation as in lines (5-7), it presupposes the S's and H's knowledge on D's parents as tobacco farmers. It is also similar to the feature of IA in lines (8-10) presuppsosing that D got his back pain based on something he did prior to the pain. This property is identifying that either speeches of the tuan guru or the person in the casual conversation require preparatory conditions of presupposing. The H is to suppose S's asserted proposition by means of his prior information or background knowledge of a given assertion.

5. Sincerity condition and its degree of strength

Every illocutionary act performed has a propositional content which is associated with a psychological state expressed. In the performance of assertion as in lines (1-15), the TG and the speakers of casual conversations express their beliefs on the propositions. Having their own

beliefs, they performed sincere assertions. In other words, they did not only express the truth of reality, but also had their given beliefs. For instance, in line (9), the speaker tells the truth that he got some pain in his back. He told this based unreality in which he truly experiences such illness. For this reason, the speaker in line (8) in this particular or other cases in the above relevant lines (1-15), they have no belief of the speaker in asserting the proposition. But, the performance of assertion is still successful, and it is defective. In this case, if the speaker performs an assertion without any reference to his/her beliefs, and then the assertions expressed are lies.

6. Degree of strength of sincerity condition

Beliefs as sincerity condition of assertion might have a degree of strength. For example, in line (1-4) the speakers' belief on the proposition asserted is stronger than that of a casual conversation (5-13). In such case, propositions asserted by the TG is grounded on the divine/supernatural truth that has an absolute truth. The motive of believing the truth is not only because they are the followers of such beliefs, but it is also being a routine exercise in attempting to do the right thing. The proposition is related to a transcendental truth. On the contrary, in casual conversations, the speakers' beliefs are less since the propositions expressed are only relate to humans and the objects. Furthermore, the truth of the proposition involves social recognition and acceptance in order to be believed by the speaker and the hearers.

The first core component of IF was illocutionary point related to the purpose of performing illocutionary act of assertives. Based on the findings, there were some aspects of illocutionary point components of each category that were different from and in line with Searle &Vanderveken' account. In case of assertive (1-14), the illocutionary point is to tell the H about something as they are.

Such illocutionary points of each category corroborate in some degrees with Searle and Vanderveken (1985/2005). However, the point of the assertion is also to make the H believe on the proposition asserted. It is the form of reactive attitude of the H to believe the S assertions. In other words, the S performance of assertion is to trigger the H reactive attitude to believe on the given proposition. In this respect, such points are not in line with Searle and Vandeveken (2005) argument that only the S has to believe the proposition in asserting and only getting the H to do as that *p.*

The second and third components are the degree of strength and the mode of achievement with respect to possibility and the way of achieving the points. As the study revealed, some subtypes of assertives have higher and lesser degree in achieving the point, and even some have a special way of achieving its points. In case of assertives, the TG' assertion is higher degree than that of an assertion of a casual conversation as in line (1) and (5). This degree is also supported by an authority of the S as a TG to achieve the point.

These degrees of strength and mode of achieving the illocutionary point with respect to corresponding assertives are in line with Searle and Vanderveken (1985/2005) believing that a category of any subtype has different degree of strength and mode of achievement of its illocutionary point. In other words, there is such element though some species of a type has the same force and point, but they may differ in the degree of strength and the mode of achievement.

The fourth element has to do with respecting the propositional content condition. The content of proposition is subject to the force of IA. In the performance of an assertion, the content of proposition is about the S telling the H about the truth of reality in the present, past or the future. The source of the truth is based on the belief to the truth of divine command as indicated in lines (1-4) and (14), personal experiences (8)- (9), and facts (5), (6), (7), (11), (12), (15). This corroborate with Searle and Vanderveken (ibid).

The fifth element of IF has to do with respect to be successful and giving a non-defective performance of speech acts is the preparatory condition. Since the truth of reality varies corresponding to species of assertive, it means that there are different presuppositions of making an assertion. As indicated in line (1), the S (TG) asserted that there is no requirement for reconciliation. This assertion presupposes the H is THE same religious background with the S; the H has gotten married; the H has divorced. Another example of assertion in casual conversation is as indicated in line (9), the S asserted that to cut the tobacco is expensive. It presupposes that the S and the H knew about the process to cut tobacco.

In accordance with such preparatory conditions of each category, the results support Searle and Vanderveken (1985/2005) account on the property of preparatory condition that is internal in nature. It is in line with some of the preparatory conditions that are subject to its illocutionary point as in making assertions.

The sixth and seventh elements of IF that pertain to intentional states in the performance of speech acts are the sincerity condition and its degree of strength. In the performance of assertive, the sincerity condition is the S's belief to reality as indicated in lines (1-15). Their belief in the truth derives from the S' belief on Islamic principles as the transcendatal truth (1-4); it comes from personal experience (8) and (9) and facts (5), (6), (7), (11), (12), (15).. In this category, the assertion is performed by the TG has a higher degree of sincerity condition than that of the rest species of assertive. Such belief included is stronger since the truth of proposition comes from the Islamic principle as the transedental truth (God's and prophet's command). So the truth is absolute and there is no doubt of the S to believe such proposition asserted. In other word, the truth of such assertion does not need social acceptance. On the contrary, the S belief in casual conversation seems to be based on personal experience and belief. Furthermore, the truth needs collective recognition and acceptance, thus, such belief is a lesser degree than that of a belief coming from the faith principles in terms of the source of truth believed.

Nature of normative dimensions of assertives

The first nature of such normativity of assertion is generated-normative. Normative features of assertives are derived from the normative standing of agents. Normative dimensions are embedded in speech acts generated from these agents' as having right, obligation and responsibility. These normative features lead the normative standing of the agents (the S and the H). Such normative standing by agents are generated from performing illocutionary acts and the ways of locutionary acts. The followings are the results and types of normative features those that support how such normativity is generated in performing speech acts.

In performing an assertion as in line (1-15), the speaker has a right to assert that (p), the S has an obligation to the truth of (p) and so on. In this case, the S' right, obligation, responsibility, and the H' right are both generated from agents altering the normative standing. Performing assertion involves intentional states (beliefs) of the S and consequently reactive attitude of the H belief to proposition asserted, as well as normative dimensions generated from agents having right, obligation and responsibility. In the performance of assertion as in lines (1-15), the followings are normative features of assertions

a. The S has right to assert if he has a belief on the truth of proposition asserted.
b. The S is responsible for his failure if he has no belief or the assertion is failed to obtain the truth of proposition
c. The S put himself on actual obligation to the truth of proposition asserted.
d. The H has the right to correct/ blame if the S' statement is not true
e. The H has an obligation to believe the S' claim (TG)

Second nature is intertwined to Intentionality. it has a crucial role for the describing agent's mental state in performing speech acts. The reason for this is that intentionality has a psychological mode and propositional content. Furthermore, intentional states involved in speech acts are représentations of its condition of satisfaction and the direction of fit. In performing assertion as in lines (1-15), the speaker asserts the truth of the proposition grounded on his belief. The speaker's belief is the intentional state of assertion. Since intention has a psychological mode (S) and representation content (r) or S (r). As in line 1, the S asserted that there is no requirement for reconciliation. In this case, the S' belief as psychological mode or intentional state in assertion impose its direction of fit, while the representation content imposes the condition of satisfaction (truth) on the condition of satisfaction (S' utterance). For this above reason, the assertion is true if the propositional /representation content is true. In case of the belief, it imposes the direction of fit, the content of assertion matches reality. So assertion has an intentional state, direction of fit and condition of satisfaction that is in line with Searle, (2000):

Table: 1 Intentional states, direction of fit and condition of satisfaction of assertives

	Intentional state
	Belief
Direction of fit	mind to world ↓
Condition of satisfaction	truth

The third nature is related to the reasons for action. The importance of reasons for action is completely related to giving the relationship of facts, human mind, and normative fact to the action. Reasons for action in terms of performing speech acts are grounded on facts, intentional states and normative entity (or factitive entity borrowed from Searle). In performing speech acts, the reasons for action include all the factitive entities or at least intentional states and normative entity. The followings are the results of reasons for action found in the study in terms of factitive entity as a valid reason for action.

Reasons for performing assertion found include facts, intentional states and normative facts. For instance, in line

(1) **Ndeq araq sarat dengan saq rujuq. (asserting)**

No-D there-adv requirement-n people-n who-pron reconcilation

There is no a requirement for people to reconcile.

Intentional state:

S believe that *p* is true.

So asserting→ Bel (p)

Normative facts:

The S has an obligation to believe that p is true.

The S has an obligation for making the H believe that p is true.

The S lays an obligation on the H to make him believe that p is true.

In this case, the assertion performed by TG includes intentional state and a normative fact as the reasons for action in performing it. These reasons for action are similar to other subtypes of assertive as in lines (2-15) involving both reasons for action. However, as indicated in lines (3), (13), and (14), the truth of proposition is conditional since its truth is subject to fulfillment of the if-clause. However, the normative fact that put an obligation on either the S or the H believing that the truth of p not conditional. Thus, the S' belief as intentional states that the truth of proposition is conditional is not the same with the S' obligation to believe that p is true or the S has an obligation to make the H believe that p is a conditional truth.

The performance of illocutionary by way of the locutionary act involves descriptive facts like the S' intention, but also normative facts such as right, obligation and responsibility. Based on this study, the normative features of performing assertion includes the S' and the H' right, obligation and responsibility. As indicated in lines (1-14), the normative dimensions generated as the following:

a. The S has a conditional right to claim an assertion that he knows *p.*

b. The S has a conditional right to reproach the H if the H has no belief on that p.

c. The S has an actual generated obligation to his claim asserted that he believes *p* is true.

d. The S is responsible for his claim that he has no belief on the truth of proposition.

e. The H has the right to correct/ blame if the S' statement is not true.

f. The H has an actual generated obligation to believe the S' assertion.

g. The H has a conditional, generated obligation to believe the S' assertion.

These normative features of assertions are generated from the S' intention that the S believes the truth of *p* and the S alters the normative standing of the H. In this case, the S commits himself to his belief of the truth *p* is in line with Searle (2010). Searle's argument is that such commitment is an essential condition is derived from the sincerity condition involving the S' intentional states (beliefs). It is similar to Alston that such obligation is just for the S only. Thus this study does not follow Searle & Alston' account that the commitment is an only a requirement for the S. This comes from the responsibility, that the S is liable for his failing on that *p.* This is in line with Alston' argument that the S takes responsibility if not that p or no belief to that *p.* furthermore, it advocates Cuneo' (2014) account that either the S or the H has right, obligation and responsibility on the belief of the truth of proposition. However, Cuneo (2014) did not provide evidence in what cases the H has an actual or conditionally generated obligation to the belief of that p.

In this study, some of the assertions may have conditional and actual generated obligations. For instance, as in line (1) the S asserted that there is no requirement for reconciliation. In this case, the S and the H have an actual generated obligation to believe that *p* is true. This also leads the H to have an actual generated right to reproach if the S's assertion is not true. In another example, in line (13), the S states that it is rich to be dukun now. In this respect, the S has actual generated obligation to his belief that *p* is true, while he has a conditional generated obligation to believe that *p* is true. For this reason, such normative features of assertion found advocate the same as Searle (2001), Alston (2000), and Cuneo (2013), but it disagrees in some degrees of points.

Intentionality

Normative features embedded to speech acts have a close relation to intentionality. These are the intentional states of an agent when performing illocutionary acts. Such intention as a

descriptive fact is identified as elements of normative facts for realist theory. Following Searle's account on features of intentionality, the intentionality has a similar structure to speech acts consisting of force and propositional content or F (p). For intentionality, it consists of psychological mode and representation content or S (r). In this respect, the intentional states involved in speech act performances impose a condition of satisfaction and direction of fit corresponding to the types of illocutionary acts.

In the performances of assertion as in lines (1-14), the belief function includes its psychological mode and condition, while condition of satisfaction imposes the truth of proposition asserted is a part of its representation content. For instance, as identified in line (1) the S asserted that there is no requirement for reconciliation of the truth. In this case, the S' belief on the truth is its psychological mode, while the truth of proposition asserted is its representation content. Furthermore, belief as its psychological mode imposes its direction of fit viz. what the S asserted is true as he believes it. Thus, the direction of fit in performing assertion is word to world or upward direction of fit. In other words, the proposition asserted is a match with reality.

In relation to normative facts, the S is normatively obliged to have a belief on the truth of proposition asserted. Furthermore, in some cases, either the S or the H is normatively obliged to have the belief of the truth of proposition asserted. This is crucial since a belief as Searle argued determines the direction of fit of any speech acts. In other words, the belief is also normatively obligatory to the S even the H in specific cases. These features extend that rationality is not only such belief, but also having such belief is normatively obligatory in the performance of assertion as an example. Thus, this finding is in line with Searle's (2010) in case of belief for performing assertions; however such belief is also normatively obligatory for the S or the H.

Reasons for action

Performing speech acts are grounded on facts, intentional states, and normative facts or using Searle's term ‘factitive entity’. The result of this study is that these foundations of reasons are corresponding to five types of illocutionary acts varying one another. Some of them take either intentional states or normative entity as the reason for action; meanwhile there are some that take facts, intentional states and normative entity.

In case of assertive (lines (1), (2), (3), and (15) it includes intentional state and normative entity as the basis reason for performing. Facts, intentional states and normative entity are included in lines (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (12), (13), (14), and (16). As for these characteristics, some have unique properties of normative entity as in cases of assertion in the former lines. In these cases, the reason for performing comes from normative entities that are actual generated obligation to believe that p is true binding to the S and the H. Meanwhile, in cases like assertion in latter lines the reasons for performing create an actual generated obligation to the S and conditional generated obligation to believe the truth of p asserted.

Based on these features, in the first cases, the H has freedom as a rational agent is bound to his actual generated obligation of the truth of p. This normative binding can be realized by the H from the second person standpoint. In this respect, through the second person's standpoint the H gives his practical authority corresponding to his reactive attitude in believing the S' given assertion. This is in line with Cuneo (2014) and Darwall (2013) . Their idea is that the H is using a second person's standpoint that can help and realize his categorical imperative that is universal and a necessity to agents to have a belief on that p. From this angle, such actual generated obligation to an agent, especially to the H is a categorical imperative as the reason for action. It is in line with Kant (Guyer, 2014) arguing that fundamental principle of morality

is the categorical imperative obliged the rational agent to do the action on the basis of moral obligation.

Likewise, to the second case, the H is bound with his conditionally generated obligation by ways of a second person's standpoint. Thus, the agent (H) having an authority, as a free agent he is bound to transforming into an agent of practical authority to give a reactive attitude for believing what is asserted. In this respect, conditional imperative might have variations according to normative entity which might include legal, prudential, practice based varieties and the rest. In this case, though it is conditional imperative to an agent, it has universal properties and necessity in character that becomes the reason for an agent in performing speech acts.

Based on such features, it does not corroborate with Searle's argument that only by way of the first point of view that is a free rational agent bound to his commitment. In this respect, it is also by way of a second person's point of view that free rational agent can be bound with his normative standing, in case of right, obligation and responsibility. It is true that some cases just take the first point of view, but some are more than that. In other words, a second person's standpoint can be means of recognizing the practical reasons for agents to be bound by his right, such as obligation and responsibility.

Moral dimensions and teaching

As described above, the performance of a speech act includes normative dimensions. Such performance is by way of descriptive facts (the S' intention and the H' expectation) and normative facts (agents' having right, obligation and responsibility). All of the normative dimensions of speech acts were found are moral. The followings are the moral aspects of normative dimensions of speech acts--according to each type of illocutionary acts:

All subtypes of assertive as indicated in lines (1-15) have normative dimensions of speech acts and *io ipso* moral aspects. In all subtypes of assertive suppose what the S asserted was true, but they speakers had no intention to believe that (p) and there was no evidence to their claims. In this case, the S violated the generated obligation to himself and the H. This normative failure is also a moral demerit. The S is dishonest to himself and the H since his claim is not accompanied by his intention and evidence to support his statements. Now suppose the S has the intention and evidence to his assertion and claim, but the H do not believe what the S asserts. In that case, the H breached his generated obligation to believe the speaker (p).

Likewise, from the right standpoint, if the S has no intention and no evidence to what the S asserted, the S has breached his standing right as the claimer or the assertor. Such normative failure is also a moral defect. The S in this situation violated his actual moral right to have a belief (p) and have an evidence of that (p). As a result, the H also has the moral right to reproach the S' normative failures.

Such moral aspects of speech act normativity imply moral values such as being honest, not lying and telling the truth, credibility, trust and not intemperate to the truth or reality

Either normative or moral dimensions embedded in the speech acts generate moral values that can be taught to children or students. These intrinsic moral values of speech acts ought to be used in moral or character teaching. Some moral values generated from these aspect within speech acts covering the core values that has been the problem of moral teaching in terms of materials. According to current traditions of character or moral teaching or character education (Lickona & Davidson 2005; Lickona, 1991, 1996; Berkowitz, 2011) there is no specific guidance on the effectiveness of methods, approaches, techniques and models in teaching practices of moral building since the qualities of those moral teaching varies accross the countries grounded on beliefs and social-cultural background. This can be a problem when

deciding about a theoretical concept as the reason for moral teaching. This fact comes from the dispute on ontology of normativity and morality (Cf. Moore (1922 [1995]), Hume (1975) Searle, (2001) and Cuneo, (2014) and others. Such disputes implies to practical concepts and the reasons for moral teaching. As indicated in current practice there is no agreeable position on the effectiveness of moral or character teaching. In other words, the problem of moral teaching derives from theoretical and practical concepts.

This study was designed to provide explicit moral values in performance of assertives and the types of moral values of given speech acts were the main concerns. The moral values that can be some basis for moral teaching by ways of speech act performance: Being honest, being credible, trust, not lying and telling the truth, not intemperate.

In this respect, students or children needs to teach explicitly on those moral values of performing assertives. The noramtive and moral features including conditional/actual right, obligation and responsibility as illustrated above could be used as the bases for building children or students moral competency. It is important to note that most of Sasaknese use Sasak language as the first language aquired by children. Hence, it seems to be possible that all children having linguistic competency of Sasak language might be taught and exposed to moral values generated in the performance of speech acts.

The moral values teaching could be done in family, school, and community practiced every day in which perform assertive daily in real communication in different context. In addition to moral values teaching, considering the universalityof language is also moral dimensions. In other words, the moral values of the first language, second and foreign language might be used depending on th children or students linguistic competence. As a result, children/ students are exposed and taught not only linguistic but also moral competency of given languages. For that reason, moral values embedded in performing speech acts of any languages could be the arena as an alternative for moral/character/values education.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of the study was to explore the illocutionary force, normative dimensions and moral teaching of assertives concerning on sasak language. The result reveals that th category of assertives grounded on IF and its component seems to be in line and contrast in some degrees with Searle and Vanderveken's decomposition of IF. The properties of the subtypes of assertive components vary according to features of the sets of necessary and sufficient condition. In relation to normative dimensions of assertives, such normative features generating from agent alteration his normative standing to the H in terms of right, obligation and responsibility. Since normativity is morality, the noramtive dimension of assertive are moral. Consequently, there are moral values generated in assertive performance like, honesty, trust, truth, ... having such moral values enable to take into account those might be useful as an arena for moral teaching. It is due to the moral values of assertives include moral reasioning, affection and behavior. Thus those aspects are relevant to the components of effective moral/character education that ought to involve comprehensive approach including moral reasoning, affective and behavior. However, based on the lack of the study focusing on assertives only, it is crucial to investigate the normative and moral dimension others types of speech acts like imperatives, commissive, expressives and declaratives. Furthermore, the further study need to discover such normative dimension in different languages whether it is the first, second or foreign language. In other words, though the language accross the world are universal, the study of different languages is pivotal to figure out the common ground of different languages, cultures and society in terms of normative and moral features. Finally, the model of moral teaching by means of speech act

normativity and morality should be design for the practical principles of moral/character/values education in schools, family and society.

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